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ABSTRACT 
It is not uncommon for the duty of care owed by a hospital to its patients to be described as ‘non-
delegable’.  Use of this label suggests that a hospital may be held strictly liable to a patient for the 
wrongdoing of a third party beyond the circumstances in which vicarious liability might be 
imposed.  To date, no higher court has used the label to impose such liability.  Notwithstanding, it 
was assumed by Lord Sumption in Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association that the duty of 
care owed by a hospital to a patient could be so described when formulating his test for 
determining the existence of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’.  This article challenges that 
assumption and, in turn, the veracity of the test devised by Lord Sumption. 
KEYWORDS:  Authority, consent, medical negligence, non-delegable duty of care, strict liability, 
vicarious liability.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association,1 the Supreme Court confirmed that the duty 
of care owed by a school to a student was ‘non-delegable’, such that a school might be held 
strictly liable,2 in certain circumstances, for harm sustained by a student as a result of the 
wrongdoing of a third party (in that case, a swimming teacher engaged by an independent 
contractor at the local Council pool).  In the course of his judgment, Lord Sumption (with 
whom Lords Clarke, Wilson and Toulson agreed) laid down a more general, five stage test for 
determining the existence of a so-called ‘non-delegable duty of care’.3  The different stages 
of the test were devised following a close examination of the principal relationships which 
Lord Sumption identified as giving rise to a ‘non-delegable duty of care’; namely, the 
relationships between an employer and employee (the ‘employment relationship’), a school 
and student (the ‘school relationship’) and hospital4 and patient (the ‘hospital relationship’).  
This article considers whether the relationships identified by Lord Sumption form an 
appropriate basis for the development of his five stage test.  Specifically, it examines whether 
                                                          
1 [2014] AC 537 (UKSC) (‘Woodland’). 
2 Defined as liability imposed regardless of personal wrongdoing; Peter Cane, Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart: 
Oxford, 1997). 
3 [2014] AC 537 (UKSC), 583. 
4 The generic term ‘hospital’ is used to cover both private and public hospitals, even though the defendant in 
the case of a public hospital is more likely to be a branch of government. 
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the duty of care owed by a hospital to a patient is indeed ‘non-delegable’, such that a hospital 
may be held strictly liable to a patient for the wrongdoing of a third party in circumstances in 
which vicarious liability does not otherwise arise.    
It is well-established that the duty of care owed by an employer to an employee5 and by a 
school to a student6 is ‘non-delegable’, having been the subject of decisions by courts at the 
highest level in both England and Australia.   The judgments of Australian courts are 
particularly relevant in this respect as it was the High Court of Australia that first recognised 
and attempted to rationalise what were previously a disparate group of liabilities imposed 
under the label ‘breach of a non-delegable duty of care’.7  Lord Sumption also drew heavily 
on the jurisprudence of the High Court of Australia in devising his test for determining the 
existence of a ‘non-delegable duty’ in Woodland.8  In contrast to the employment and school 
relationships, the status of the duty of care arising within the hospital relationship is not so 
clear.  As Lord Sumption himself noted, despite dicta in a number of English cases that has 
described the duty of care owed by a hospital to a patient as ‘non-delegable’, that ‘dicta [has] 
never been adopted as part of the ratio of any English case’.9  The position in Australia is 
similar.10  This article argues that differences in the nature of the hospital, employment and 
school relationships makes the analogy drawn by Lord Sumption in Woodland between those 
relationships unsound.  As this analogy underpinned the five stage test for determining the 
existence of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ devised by Lord Sumption, the veracity of that test 
must now also be brought into question.   
Part one of the article examines the cases in which it has been suggested that the duty of care 
owed by a hospital to a patient is ‘non-delegable’.  Notwithstanding the continued willingness 
of some judges to use the label ‘non-delegable’ to describe the duty of care owed by a hospital 
to a patient, there is little evidence to suggest that use of the label ‘non-delegable’ has 
correspondingly led to an increased willingness by the courts to impose strict liability on a 
hospital to a patient for the wrongdoing of a third party beyond the circumstances in which 
vicarious liability might be imposed.    
Part two explores the features of the hospital relationship that continue to attract some 
judges to the idea that the duty of care owed by a hospital to a patient is ‘non-delegable’.  
Those features include the information deficit borne by a patient relative to a hospital, the 
fact that a patient and hospital are not strangers at the time of the wrongdoing and the 
                                                          
5 McDermid v Nash Dredging and Reclamation Co Ltd [1987] AC 906 (HL); Kondis v State Transport Authority 
(formerly Victorian Railways Board) (1984) 154 CLR 672 (HCA). 
6 Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2014] AC 537 (UKSC); Commonwealth of Australia v Introvigne 
(1982) 150 CLR 258 (HCA). 
7 See Mason J in Kondis v State Transport Authority (formerly Victorian Railways Board) (1984) 154 CLR 672 
(HCA). 
8 [2014] AC 537, 583 (UKSC). 
9 ibid 579. 
10 Dicta supporting such a duty can be founded in cases such as Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty 
Limited (1994) 179 CLR 520 (HCA) 550-551.  As will be demonstrated below, however, there are no cases in 
which strict liability has been imposed on a hospital on the basis of the presence of such a duty. 
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capacity of a hospital to exercise control over a patient’s use of the hospital premises and, in 
some circumstances, a patient’s body.11  It is argued in part three that none of these features, 
either together or in isolation, provide a convincing basis for the imposition of strict liability 
on a hospital for the wrongdoing of a third party outside the circumstances in which vicarious 
liability might be imposed within the current strictures of private law. 
Part four compares the features of the hospital relationship with the features of the other 
relationships that have been judicially recognised as giving rise to a ‘non-delegable duty of 
care’.  It demonstrates that there are significant differences between the hospital, 
employment and school relationships, not the least of which is the authority vested in an 
employer or school to direct the conduct of an employee or student, an authority which is 
absent from the hospital relationship.   
The final part of this article suggests that it is the conferral of this authority to direct the 
conduct of an employee or student by an employer or school upon a third party that attracts 
the extraordinary form of strict liability imposed for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’.  
As such authority is not a feature of the hospital relationship, it is concluded that there is no 
sound basis for describing the duty of care owed by a hospital to a patient as ‘non-delegable’ 
and consequently no sound basis for imposing strict liability on a hospital for the wrongdoing 
of a third party outside circumstances which give rise to vicarious liability. 
II. THE HOSPITAL CASES 
The first suggestion that the duty of care owed by a hospital to a patient was ‘non-delegable’ 
was made by Lord Green MR in Gold v Essex County Council.12  In that case, a five year old girl 
required treatment for warts on her face.  On attending at the hospital, she was seen by a 
visiting dermatologist who suggested the warts be treated by the application of Grenz rays.  
She was then sent to the radiology department where she was treated by a competent 
radiologist employed by the hospital.  On the sixth treatment, the radiologist forgot to cover 
the unaffected parts of the young girl’s face with a protective, lead-lined rubber cloth.  As a 
result, the girl’s face was ‘permanently disfigured’.13    
Had Gold been decided today, the case would have been relatively straightforward.  Vicarious 
liability would have been imposed as a matter of course once it was established that the 
radiologist was an employee of the hospital and was acting in the course of his employment 
at the time the negligence occurred (such that the negligence could be viewed as sufficiently 
‘closely connected’ with the employment for vicarious liability to arise14).  At the time Gold 
                                                          
11 The focus of this article is on examining the legal significance of the features of the hospital relationship for 
the purposes of determining whether strict liability for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ might extend 
to that relationship.  For this reason, it does not engage more broadly with sociological or philosophical 
understandings of that relationship.  For further information see Chapter 5 ‘Power relations and the medical 
encounter’ of Deborah Lupton, Medicine as Culture (Sage Publications:  London, 2nd ed,  2003). 
12 [1942] 2 KB 293 (CA) (‘Gold’). 
13 ibid 294. 
14 Mohamud v VM Morrisons Supermarkets plc [2016] AC 677 (UKSC). 
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was decided, however, there was some doubt as to whether a hospital could be held 
vicariously liable for the negligence of a doctor or any other medical practitioners employed 
by the hospital.  Medical practitioners were not thought of as ‘servants in the proper sense of 
the word’.15  This was because a hospital could not control medical practitioners in the 
performance of their duties due to their special skill and knowledge.  As Farwell LJ commented 
in Hillyer v The Governors of St. Bartholomew’s Hospital:16 
This is…essential to the success of operations; no surgeon would undertake the responsibility of 
operations of his orders and directions were subject to the control of or interference by the governing 
body.   
Faced with these difficulties, Lord Greene MR held in Gold that the duty of care owed by the 
hospital to the patient was ‘non-delegable’.  He argued that, as the hospital had undertaken 
to care for the patient, the hospital could not escape liability for negligence in the course of 
that care by delegating that care to another person (in that case, the radiologist).17  In his 
view, because the hospital had ‘assumed responsibility’ for the care of the patient, it followed 
that the hospital was strictly liable to the patient for the negligence of the radiologist whether 
or not the radiologist was an employee.18 
The other two members of the court, however, chose to deal with the issue much more 
directly.  Lord Justice MacKinnon did not accept the views expressed in Hillyer and held that 
vicarious liability could be imposed on an employer for the negligence of an employee even 
if that employee was a medical practitioner and exercised skill beyond the control of the 
employer.  Lord Justice MacKinnon said:19 
(1) One who employs a servant is liable to another person if the servant does an act within the scope 
of his employment so negligently as to injure that other…(2) That principle applies even though the 
work which the servant is employed to do is of a skilful or technical character as to the method of 
performing which the employer is himself ignorant, for example, a shipowner and the certified captain 
who navigates the ship. 
Lord Justice Goddard also suggested that whether or not a hospital could be held strictly liable 
for the negligence of a medical practitioner depended on whether the medical practitioner 
was employed under a contract of service as opposed to a contract for service.20  
Consequently, both MacKinnon LJ and Goddard LJ imposed vicarious liability on the hospital 
                                                          
15 Hillyer v The Governors of St. Bartholomew’s Hospital [1909] 2 KB 820 (CA), 825 (Farwell LJ). 
16 ibid 826. 
17 Gold v Essex County Council [1942] 2 KB 293 (CA), 301. 
18 ibid 303. 
19 ibid 304-305. 
20 ibid 313 (Goddard LJ):  ‘Hospital managers, be they local authorities or governors of voluntary institutions, 
nowadays have in their service many specialists – solicitors, accountants, engineers, electricians and the like.  I 
can see no sound reason why they should be responsible for the acts of these servants and not for those or 
nurses who are equally in their service.  That they are not liable for the doctor’s negligence is due simply and 
solely to the fact that he is not their servant.  I desire, however, to say that for the purpose of this judgment I 
am not considering the case of doctors on the permanent staff of the hospital.  Whether the authority would 
be liable for their negligence depends, in my opinion, on whether there is a contract of service and that must 
depend on the facts of any particular case.’  
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in Gold in accordance with ordinary principles; the radiologist was an employee who had been 
negligent in the course of his employment.   
The question of whether the duty of care owed by a hospital to a patient could be considered 
‘non-delegable’ was next considered by the Court of Appeal in Cassidy v Ministry of Health.21  
In that case, the patient was a general labourer who had been admitted to hospital for a 
procedure on his hand.  The procedure involved keeping the patient’s hand in a rigid splint 
for fourteen days.  On removal of the splint at the end of the period, the patient was unable 
to use his fingers.  Subsequent treatment did not lead to any improvement and the patient 
effectively lost the use of the hand.  Although the patient faced evidential difficulties in 
identifying the actual cause of his problems, the court was prepared to rely on the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine and all judges found the hospital liable to the patient.   Lord Justice 
Somervell and Singleton LJ based their decision on the fact that all the medical practitioners 
involved in the treatment of the patient at the hospital were employees of the hospital.  As a 
result, vicarious liability was imposed on the hospital in accordance with ordinary principles.22       
In contrast, Denning LJ persisted with Lord Greene MR’s view in Gold that a hospital owed a 
patient a so-called ‘non-delegable duty of care’.  Lord Justice Denning said:23 
I take it to be clear law as well as good sense, that, where a person is himself under a duty to use care, 
he cannot get rid of his responsibility by delegating the performance of it to someone else, no matter 
whether the delegation be to a servant under a contract of service or to an independent contractor 
under a contract for services. 
On the facts of the case, that duty had been breached as a result of the negligence of the 
hospital’s employees.  It was therefore not necessary to recognise a so-called ‘non-delegable 
duty’ and no such duty was recognised by the other judges. 
Lord Justice Denning once again resorted to the idea that the duty of care owed by a hospital 
to a patient was ‘non-delegable’ in Roe v Minister of Health.24  In that case the hospital was 
found not liable to the patient.  This was because all members of the court found that the 
medical practitioners in question had not been negligent.  If the medical practitioners had 
been negligent, it is not entirely clear that the other members of the court would have been 
prepared to find that the duty of care owed by the hospital to the patient was ‘non-delegable’.  
Lord Justice Somervell was of the view that vicarious liability could have been imposed on the 
basis that the medical practitioners were employed by the hospital and were acting in the 
course of their employment at the relevant time.25  Lord Justice Morris quoted extensively 
from the judgment of Lord Greene MR in Gold, but he also found the medical practitioners in 
question to be employees.26    
                                                          
21 [1951] 2 KB 343 (CA. 
22 ibid 351 (Somervell LJ) and 354-355 (Singleton LJ). 
23 ibid 363. 
24 [1954] 2 QB 67 (CA). 
25 ibid 79-80. 
26 ibid 88. 
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Evidently, the impetus for labelling the duty of care owed by a hospital to a patient ‘non-
delegable’ lay in the historical difficulties in holding a hospital vicariously liable for the 
negligence of highly skilled medical staff.  As a majority of judges preferred to reform the law 
of vicarious liability directly, it would not have been surprising if the tendency to describe the 
duty of care owed by a hospital to a patient as ‘non-delegable’ lapsed once the barriers to 
holding a hospital vicariously liable for the negligence of highly skilled medical staff were 
formally removed.  This did not transpire.  The High Court of Australia has suggested in dicta 
on at least two subsequent occasions that the duty of care owed by a hospital to its patients 
is ‘non-delegable’.27  Similar comments were made by the House of Lords28 and there are a 
handful of lower court cases in which a hospital has been found to owe a ‘non-delegable duty 
of care’.29  This appears to have been sufficient for Lord Sumption to accept in Woodland that 
the duty of care arising within the hospital relationship is ‘non-delegable’. 
Use of a label, however, does not always correspond with effect.  The legal effect generally 
associated with use of the label ‘non-delegable’ to describe a duty of care is the imposition of 
strict liability on the duty holder for the wrongdoing of a third party in circumstances beyond 
those in which vicarious liability might be imposed.30  Prior to identifying the hospital 
relationship as one which gave rise to a ‘non-delegable duty of care’, it was arguably therefore 
also necessary for Lord Sumption to ask whether use of the label ‘non-delegable’ had led to a 
corresponding increase in the willingness of the courts to impose strict liability on a hospital 
for the wrongdoing of a third party beyond the circumstances in which vicarious liability might 
be imposed.  As an examination of the cases show, answering this question is not at all 
straightforward. 
First, there have only been a small number of cases which have actually considered the ‘non-
delegable duty’ owed by hospital to patient.  Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR suggested 
in A v Ministry of Defence31 that in England this was because the ‘authorities administering 
the NHS ceased to take issue on the extent of their liability for treatment negligently 
administered’.32  Consequently, the whole question of the strict liability of a hospital for the 
negligence of a medical practitioner (whether employee or independent contractor) became 
somewhat of a non-issue.33  Substantial access to medical indemnity funds can perhaps 
                                                          
27 See Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672 (HCA) 685 and Burnie Port Authority v General 
Jones Pty Limited (1994) 179 CLR 520 (HCA) 550.  
28 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 (HL) 740 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
29 See below. 
30 Christian Witting, ‘Breach of the non-delegable duty of care: defending limited strict liability in tort’ (2006) 
29 UNSWLJ 33; cf John Murphy, ‘The liability bases of common law non-delegable duties – a reply to Christian 
Witting’ (2007) 30 UNSWLJ 86. 
31 [2005] QB 183 (CA). 
32 That is, after the introduction of the NHS indemnity following amendments to The National Health Service 
Act 1977 (UK) in the early 1990’s.  ibid 198. 
33 As economic pressures force the NHS to contract, this is likely to become more of an issue in the future with 
the NHS using a greater number of private providers and patients being able to supplement their NHS 
treatment with private treatment.  It was also anticipated when the NHS indemnity was first introduced, that 
foundation hospitals would at some stage lose the benefit of the indemnity; Lawrence Vick with Martin Young, 
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explain the small number of cases in Australia.  The availability of such funds means that 
where the negligent medical practitioner is a doctor, a claim brought directly against the 
negligent doctor can be easily satisfied.34   
Secondly, in the cases in which courts have purported to hold a hospital strictly liable for 
breach of the ‘non-delegable duty’ owed to a patient, most have involved the negligence of 
at least one medical practitioner employed by the hospital or, alternatively, personal 
negligence on the part of the hospital itself. 35 Accordingly, the liability imposed on a hospital 
in these cases can be described as vicarious liability or, alternatively, personal liability.  In 
Samios v Repatriation Commission,36 for instance, the patient sued the Repatriation 
Commission when he attended a hospital operated by the Commission on at least three 
occasions and the medical practitioners he saw failed to diagnose and treat his dislocated 
shoulder.  Jackson SPJ found a doctor employed by the Commission to be negligent as well as 
the radiologists of a clinic that had been engaged by the Commission to provide support 
services whilst its own radiologists were on vacation.37  The liability of the Commission in that 
case can therefore be described as vicarious liability for the negligence of the doctor it 
employed.  It was also suggested, though not proved, that personal liability might also have 
been imposed on the Commission by reason of the Commission’s inadequate systems.38   
The only case in England39 or Australia in which liability has been imposed on a hospital for 
the wrongdoing of a medical practitioner where the liability could not be described as 
vicarious or personal appears to be the decision of a single county court judge in Calderdale 
                                                          
‘Insurance against clinical negligence for private providers of NHS care’ (Centre for Health and the Public 
Interest) www://chpi.org.uk/blog/insurance-clinical-negligence-private-providers-nhs-care/ accessed 11 April 
2017.  Of course, it remains very much a live issue for private hospitals which operate without the benefit of 
the NHS indemnity. 
34 A similar suggestion has been made to explain the situation in Canada.  Blair JA said in Yepremian v 
Scarborough General Hospital (1980) 110 DLR (3d) 513 (Ont. CA) 560:  ‘’What all the cases reveal is the 
procedural convenience and administrative simplicity of holding hospitals liable only for the negligence of 
doctors employed by them and making other doctors on their staffs directly answerable to their patients for 
their negligence.  The uniformity of this practice has a practical explanation well known to the legal profession.  
Under the present regime of public insurance for medical expenses, hospitals and doctors bill the insurance 
authority separately.  In addition, hospitals have no ‘deeper’ pockets than doctors from which to pay damages 
because of the universality of medical liability insurance coverage.’ 
35 See Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 (NSWCA) in which the negligent 
orthopaedic surgeon was found to be an employee.  See also Bull v Devon Area Health Authority [1993] 4 Med 
LR 117 (CA) in which the hospital was found personally liable for failing to have in place a reasonable system to 
call for back-up staff in the event of an emergency.  No medical staff were found to have been negligent in the 
case. 
36 [1960] WAR 219 (WASC). 
37 ibid 228. 
38 ibid (Jackson SPJ).  ‘For this, I think, Dr Traub must take primary responsibility, but perhaps the hospital 
system itself should not escape some criticism.’  For an English equivalent, see Bull v Devon Area Health 
Authority [1993] 4 Med LR 117 (CA). 
39 Though note the recent decision of the Court of Session, Scotland in Bell v Alliance Medical Ltd [2015] CSOH 
34.  Counsel for the first second party conceded the duty of care owed by the health board was ‘non-
delegable’ following the decision in Woodland.  No liability was imposed on the basis of this concession, 
however, as the claim for contribution was denied as it would involve the first third party relying on their 
negligence to secure that contribution from the Health Board (see [119]). 
8 
 
& Kirklees Health Authority.40  In that case, the patient had been referred by a Community 
Health Centre operated by the health authority to a hospital in the local area for an abortion.  
The abortion was performed negligently, and the patient successfully sued the health 
authority for breach of its so-called ‘non-delegable duty of care’ when the hospital that 
performed the operation became insolvent.  Of this decision, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers 
MR said in A v Ministry of Defence:41 
The exception is the finding of the existence of a non-delegable duty of care made by Judge Garner as 
one of the grounds of his decisions in M v Calderdale and Kirklees Health Authority.  This finding did not 
represent the current state of English law.   
Given such comments, Calderdale hardly provides convincing evidence of the courts’ 
willingness to impose strict liability on a hospital for breach of the so-called ‘non-delegable 
duty of care’ owed to a patient. 
Third, there have been a number of cases in which the courts have refused to impose strict 
liability on a hospital for breach of the ‘non-delegable duty of care’ owed to its patients.  In 
Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital,42 for instance, a majority of the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal found that a hospital could not be held strictly liable for the negligence of an honorary 
medical officer who used the hospital’s operating theatres for his own patients.  Samuels JA, 
with whom Meagher JA agreed, examined the initial trilogy of English cases and noted that it 
was a minority view that a hospital owed a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ to a patient.  Despite 
this, he felt bound to acknowledge that the duty of care owed by a hospital to a patient was 
‘non-delegable’ given the High Court of Australia’s support for such a duty in the above 
mentioned dicta.43  He was not, however, prepared to find the hospital strictly liable for the 
negligence of the honorary medical officer in the circumstances of the case.  Samuels JA 
tightly circumscribed the type of medical practitioner for whom a hospital could be held 
strictly liable for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ and held that, as the honorary 
medical officer in the case was ‘engaged in his own business and not the hospital’s’,44 the 
strict liability of the hospital for breach of its ‘non-delegable duty of care’ did not extend to 
the particular honorary medical officer. 
The English Court of Appeal also refused to impose strict liability on a hospital for breach of 
the ‘non-delegable duty of care’ owed to a patient in A v Ministry of Defence.45  The patient 
in that case was the small child of a soldier stationed in Germany who had sustained severe 
brain damage at the time of his birth due to the negligence of a German obstetrician at a 
German hospital.  The Ministry of Defence was sued for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty of 
care’ owed to the child on the basis that the Ministry of Defence had previously operated its 
                                                          
40 [1998] Lloyds Law Reports: Medical 157 (CC) (‘Calderdale’). 
41 [2005] QB 183, 203 (CA). 
42 (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 (NSWCA). 
43 See above (n 27). 
44 (1989) 17 NSWLR 553, 599 (NSWCA). 
45 [2005] QB 183 (CA).  In Woodland, Lord Sumption agreed with the result reached in this case, but not the 
reasoning; [2013] UKSC 66 [24]. 
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own hospitals in Germany for military personnel and their families.  Those hospitals were later 
closed for financial reasons.  In their stead, the Ministry of Defence had made arrangements 
with a number of German hospitals to provide medical treatment to military personnel and 
their families in accordance with English standards.  Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR 
(with whom the other judges agreed) found that the Ministry of Defence was not strictly liable 
to the child even though the Ministry of Defence had undertaken to provide medical care.  In 
his view, the Ministry of Defence could not be held strictly liable for the negligence of the 
German obstetrician at a German hospital which was not operated by the defendant.   
A similar decision was reached by the English Court of Appeal in Farraj v King’s Healthcare 
NHS Trust.46  The patient in that case resided in Jordan.  She was pregnant and wanted to test 
that her unborn baby had not contracted a genetic disease carried by both parents.  A sample 
of foetal tissue was sent to the defendant’s hospital in London for testing.  The defendant 
hospital subcontracted the testing to an external laboratory which negligently confirmed that 
the sample was ‘all clear’.  The court found that the hospital was not strictly liable to the 
patient even though the hospital had arranged for the testing to be undertaken.  Once again 
the court held that the hospital could not be held strictly liable for the wrongdoing of an 
external service provider. 
It might be that cases such as these can be explained by reference to specific facts which 
made it inappropriate in each of the cases to impose strict liability on the hospital for breach 
of the ‘non-delegable duty of care’ owed to the patient.47  If so, they are not particularly 
significant.  It is, however, very difficult to draw from the reasoning of the judges in those 
cases any convincing factual distinctions which would justify imposing strict liability on a 
hospital for breach of the ‘non-delegable duty of care’ owed to a patient in one situation but 
not the other.  In Ellis, for instance, the court was concerned that the honorary medical officer 
was involved in carrying on his own business and not that of the hospital.  This was evidenced 
by the fact that the honorary medical officer was not paid by the hospital.  Although the 
honorary medical officer ‘accepted a degree of management’48 from the hospital, because he 
was not paid by the hospital he could be considered to be carrying on his own business.  This 
reasoning seems to contradict that in A v Ministry of Defence where the fact that the Ministry 
of Defence did pay for the negligent medical services was thought significant in refusing to 
impose strict liability for the wrongdoing of another for breach of the ‘non-delegable duty of 
care’.  
In Farraj v King’s Healthcare NHS Trust it was said to be significant that the claimant was not 
an in-patient of the hospital.49  But at the same time, Dyson LJ was using examples to justify 
his decision which would have supported denial of strict liability even if the claimant had been 
an inpatient.  For instance, Dyson LJ was of the view that the purchaser of a car could not sue 
                                                          
46 [2010] 1 WLR 2139 (CA). 
47 Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP: Oxford, 2007) 117-119, 123.  
48 (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 (NSWCA) 599. 
49 [2010] 1 WLR 2139 (CA) 2163-2164. 
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the manufacturer where damage was sustained as a result of defects in the steel used in the 
car’s construction after the steel had been sent to an appropriately skilled independent 
contractor for testing.50  Similarly, he thought a building owner could not sue the building 
developer for damage caused by defects in concrete used in the building which had been sent 
to an appropriately skilled independent contractor for testing.51  It would follow from 
Dyson LJ’s examples that whether a patient is an in-patient or not, once material has been 
sent to a reputable, external independent contractor for testing, no strict liability for the 
hospital could arise.   
Lord Sumption tried to navigate these difficulties in Woodland by wording his five stage test 
for a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ in such a way that could satisfactorily explain why strict 
liability for the wrongdoing of a third party was not imposed on the hospitals in these cases, 
regardless of the actual reasoning used by the judges in those cases.  He consequently 
emphasised requirements such as the need for a patient to be in the ‘actual custody, charge 
or care’52 of the hospital and the need for the function delegated to the third party to be an 
‘integral part’53 of the duty ‘assumed’54 by the hospital towards the patient.  The decision in 
Farraj was therefore correct, according to Lord Sumption, on the basis that the claimant was 
not an in-patient of the defendant hospital.55  What is not clear from Lord Sumption’s decision 
is whether, in his view, the result should have been different if the claimant was an in-patient 
of the defendant hospital.  What if the hospital regularly sub-contracted out such testing 
because they didn’t have the facilities to do it?  Even though such testing would arguably have 
been ‘integral’ to the patient’s treatment, could it then be argued that the hospital had not 
‘assumed responsibility’ for such testing?  It was on this basis that Lord Sumption agreed with 
the decision in A v Ministry of Defence, though not the reasoning.  In Lord Sumption’s view, 
the Ministry of Defence had not ‘assumed responsibility’ for the provision of medical 
treatment to the soldiers and their families.  But what does ‘assumed responsibility’ mean in 
this context?  Is it that the hospital impliedly promised to perform that particular duty or 
function, or that the hospital assumed the legal risk of the consequences of the duty or 
function not being performed or more simply that the hospital voluntarily chose to act in a 
particular way.56  It is difficult to dismiss the unwillingness of the courts to impose strict 
liability in cases such as Farraj and A v Ministry of Defence as fact dependent when the test 
employed by the courts for imposing a ‘non-delegable duty’ rest on concepts as imprecise 
and contestable as an ‘assumption of responsibility’.  
                                                          
50 ibid 2165. 
51 ibid. At least at common law, cf Consumer Protection Act 1987 (UK). 
52 [2014] AC 537 (UKSC), 583.   
53 ibid. 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid 584. 
56 Kit Barker, ‘Unreliable assumptions in the modern law of negligence’ (1993) 109 LQR 461. 
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III. FEATURES OF THE HOSPITAL RELATIONSHIP THAT APPEAR TO ATTRACT USE OF 
THE LABEL ‘NON-DELEGABLE’ TO DESCRIBE THE DUTY OF CARE OWED BY A 
HOSPITAL TO ITS PATIENTS 
As can be seen, it is difficult to support Lord Sumption’s conclusion that the hospital 
relationship gives rise to a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ from an analysis of the cases alone.  
Although the cases show a continued willingness by the courts to describe the duty of care 
owed by a hospital to a patient as ‘non-delegable’ (despite removal of the formal barriers to 
holding a hospital vicariously liable which prompted the label’s initial use), there is little 
evidence to suggest that the label’s use has correspondingly led to an increased willingness 
by the courts to impose strict liability on a hospital to a patient for the wrongdoing of a third 
party beyond the circumstances in which vicarious liability might be imposed (the recognised 
legal effect of describing a duty of care as ‘non-delegable’).   Further support for Lord 
Sumption’s identification of the hospital relationship as a relationship which gives rise to a 
‘non-delegable duty of care’ is therefore required.  This section will examine the hospital 
relationship in an attempt to identify the features of the relationship that continue to attract 
use of the label ‘non-delegable’ and consider whether those features might possibly be used 
to support the imposition of strict liability on a hospital for the wrongdoing of a third party in 
circumstances beyond vicarious liability. 
A. Vulnerability (or more accurately, an information deficit) 
The first feature of the hospital relationship generally identified as supporting the imposition 
of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ is the so-called ‘vulnerability’ of a patient relative to a 
hospital.  This is reflected in stage one of Lord Sumption’s test for determining a ‘non-
delegable duty’:57 
(1) The claimant is a patient or a child, or for some other reason is especially vulnerable or dependent on 
the protection of the defendant against the risk of injury. 
There are a number of ways a patient might be described as ‘vulnerable’ relative to a hospital.  
A patient will be suffering, or believe themselves to be suffering, a medical condition which 
may put their physical or mental health at risk.  To the extent a hospital has the expertise and 
other resources to both identify and treat this medical condition, a patient will be dependent 
on a hospital to accurately determine the nature of the patient’s medical condition and 
provide appropriate treatment in order to restore or maintain the patient’s wellbeing.   
Medical treatment can itself also be physically invasive.  It may therefore present as much of 
a risk to a patient as not receiving medical treatment at all.  A patient is once again dependent 
on a hospital determining and delivering the appropriate level of medical treatment in a way 
that minimises those risks.  
Is the term ‘vulnerability’ particularly useful in describing what it is about the hospital 
relationship that might attract the imposition of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’?  
                                                          
57 [2014] AC 537 (UKSC), 583. 
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‘Vulnerability’ is a much maligned term, its definition hard to pin down.58  In the quote above, 
Lord Sumption appears to use the terms ‘vulnerability’ and ‘dependence’ interchangeably.  In 
the context of the hospital relationship, the term ‘dependence’ appears more apt; it being 
difficult to attribute any meaning to the term ‘vulnerability’ beyond the ‘dependence’ of a 
patient on a hospital to determine the nature of a medical condition and appropriate medical 
treatment.  ‘Dependence’ though offers little more by way of clarity than the term 
‘vulnerability’; it is a relative concept which varies in degree and nature with the specific 
circumstances. 
What then is it specifically about the hospital relationship that gives rise to this sense of a 
patient’s ‘vulnerability’ or ‘dependency’?  One factor is the state of a patient’s health; the 
more severe a patient’s medical condition the more ‘vulnerable’ or ‘dependent’ a patient will 
be.  As patients should be entitled to a similar standard of care whatever the state of their 
health, it is difficult to see how the state of a particular patient’s health can be used as a 
marker for determining a hospital’s legal liability.59  Of more significance is the information 
deficit shared by patients relative to a hospital.60  Even with the advances in information 
dissemination in the modern age, without medical training, a patient is at a distinct 
disadvantage to a hospital with respect to identifying the nature of their medical condition 
and an appropriate course of medical treatment.  The information deficit makes it difficult for 
a patient to determine whether to consent to medical treatment proposed by a hospital.  As 
the grant of consent can effectively relieve a hospital from liability in certain circumstances, 
the information deficit places a patient at a distinct disadvantage.61  Where alternate care is 
available, the information deficit can also make it difficult for a patient to determine if and 
when such care should be accessed.   The information deficit can even make it difficult for a 
patient to determine whether the actual medical treatment being administered is necessary 
or in fact constitutes medical treatment (rather than a form of abuse, undertaken for a 
medical practitioner’s own pleasure62).  Arguably, it is this information deficit that underpins 
the ‘vulnerability’ or ‘dependency’ of a patient on a hospital.  In order to avoid the definitional 
uncertainty surrounding those terms, the information deficit borne by a patient relative to a 
hospital will be used for the purposes of this article as the first relevant feature of the hospital 
relationship that might attract the imposition of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ and possibly 
justify the imposition of strict liability on a hospital for the wrongdoing of a third party beyond 
the circumstances in which vicarious liability might be imposed.   
                                                          
58 Jane Stapleton, ‘The Golden Thread at the Heart of Tort Law: Protection of the vulnerable’ in Peter Cane (ed) 
Centenary Essays for the High Court of Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths: Chatswood, 2004) 242. 
59 This unfortunately means that little legal weight can be given, for these purposes, to a broader sociological 
understanding of the vulnerability faced by various patients; see above (n 11) 94-98, 114.  
60 See generally Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] AC 1430 (‘Montgomery’). 
61 A point discussed further below. 
62 For example, where a radiologist used the opportunity of an ultra sound to sexually abuse a patient; 
Weingerl v Seo (2005) 256 DLR (4th) 1 (Ont. CA). 
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B. Assumption of Responsibility (or more accurately, a pre-existing relationship and 
control) 
Terminological difficulties also arise with the second feature of the hospital relationship 
generally identified as supporting the imposition of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’, the so-
called ‘assumption of responsibility’ by a hospital to a patient.63  It is possible, however, to 
glean clues as to the specific features of the hospital relationship that might inform this ill-
defined concept from the second stage of Lord Sumption’s test in Woodland:64 
(2) There is an antecedent relationship between the claimant and the defendant, independent of the 
negligent act or omission itself, (i) which places the claimant in the actual custody, charge or care of the 
defendant, and (ii) from which it is possible to impute to the defendant the assumption of a positive 
duty to protect the claimant from harm, and not just a duty to refrain from conduct which will 
foreseeably damage the claimant.  It is characteristic of such relationships that they involve an element 
of control over the claimant, which varies in intensity from one situation to another… 
When considered in the context of the hospital relationship, the features Lord Sumption 
appears to identify as relevant include the fact of the relationship itself (to the extent it 
predates any wrongdoing) and the degree of a control a hospital might exercise over a patient 
given that the patient is in the hospital’s ‘custody, charge or care’.   
It is somewhat trite to suggest that the existence of a hospital relationship is a feature of the 
hospital relationship that might attract the imposition of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’.  To 
the extent that it denotes that a hospital and patient are not strangers at the time of the 
wrongdoing, it is a relatively uncontroversial, but nonetheless potentially relevant, feature of 
the hospital relationship that might possibly justify, at least in part, the imposition of strict 
liability on a hospital for the wrongdoing of a third party beyond the circumstances in which 
vicarious liability might be imposed.   
More difficult is control, which, like ‘dependency’, is a relative concept that varies in degree 
and nature with the specific circumstances.  One form of control exercised by a hospital is the 
physical control exerted over the hospital premises.  This includes the capacity to exclude 
patients from the premises in certain circumstances and to dictate the terms of the patient’s 
use of the premises.  Depending on the nature of the medical treatment, a hospital may also 
exercise some degree of control over a patient’s body.  The extent of this control will vary 
considerably from relatively limited control in circumstances where a patient has undergone 
non-invasive testing and received information from a hospital to substantial control in 
circumstances where a patient is placed under anaesthetic for the purposes of undergoing an 
invasive medical procedure or is otherwise unconscious.  Being specific as to the particular 
form of control exercised by a hospital over a patient assists in overcoming some of the 
definitional uncertainty surrounding control.  Although not removed, the uncertainty is 
sufficiently reduced for such control to be identified as a feature of the hospital relationship 
that might attract the imposition of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ and possibly justify the 
                                                          
63 See above (n 56). 
64 [2014] AC 537, 583. 
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imposition of strict liability on a hospital for the wrongdoing of a third party beyond the 
circumstances in which vicarious liability might be imposed.    
It follows that there are at least three features65 of the hospital relationship that might explain 
the continued attraction of some judges to describing the duty of care owed by a hospital to 
a patient as ‘non-delegable’:  the information deficit borne by a patient relative to a hospital; 
the fact that a hospital and patient are not strangers prior to any wrongdoing; and the 
capacity of a hospital to exercise control over a patient’s use of the hospital premises and, in 
some circumstances, a patient’s body.   
IV. JUSTIFYING THE IMPOSITION OF STRICT LIABILITY ON A HOSPITAL FOR THE 
WRONGDOING OF A THIRD PARTY OUTSIDE VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Having identified the features of the hospital relationship that continue to attract use of the 
label ‘non-delegable’ to describe the duty of care owed by a hospital to its patients, the 
question now is whether these features, together or in isolation, might be used to justify the 
imposition of strict liability on a hospital for the wrongdoing of a third party in circumstances 
beyond those in which vicarious liability might be imposed. 
A. Information Deficit 
Turning first to the information deficit borne by a patient relative to a hospital.  Information 
deficits are a not uncommon feature of many professional relationships.  Clients of solicitors, 
accountants, architects and other professionals will generally be less informed than the 
professionals they are dealing with, precipitating the need to engage the professional in the 
first place.  There is no relevant difference for these purposes between a relationship with a 
client and an individual professional (for example, a lawyer engaged in sole practice, or a 
similarly engaged consultant neurologist) and a relationship with a client and an organisation 
providing professional services by engaging professionals (for example, a law firm or a 
hospital).  Significantly, it has never been suggested that that the duty of care owed by an 
organisation providing professional services (other than a hospital) is ‘non-delegable’, such 
that strict liability might be imposed on that organisation for the wrongdoing of a professional 
engaged by the organisation in circumstances beyond which vicarious liability might arise.66   
Instead, tort law responds to the risks presented by the information deficit found in a 
professional relationship by extending liability in negligence to cover omissions, as well as 
acts.  It follows that in certain circumstances a professional may be held liable not only for 
foreseeable harm caused to the client by the professional’s own unreasonable conduct, but 
for failing to take reasonable, positive steps to prevent, more generally, harm to the client 
                                                          
65 See below for a brief discussion of additional, less significant features identified by Lord Sumption in 
Woodland. 
66 The hospital relationship is compared with other relationships that do give rise to a so-called ‘non-delegable 
duty of care’ in part V below. 
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which the professional could have reasonably foreseen.67  Such extended liability is difficult 
to justify in the context of strangers, given the primacy tort law places on freedom of action.68   
The fact that the professional relationship exists prior to any wrongdoing is consequently a 
relevant feature of the professional relationship which enables such extended liability to be 
imposed.   
If an information deficit is not generally sufficient to warrant the imposition of a ‘non-
delegable duty of care’, is the information deficit borne by a patient relative to a hospital 
somehow different from the information deficits found in other professional relationships to 
justify the imposition of such strict liability?   The only possible difference seems to lie in the 
potential consequences of that information deficit.  In a hospital relationship, the information 
deficit might have direct consequences for a patient’s physical health (or, in the language of 
tort law, a patient’s physical integrity69), whereas in a number of other professional 
relationships, a client’s economic interests are more likely to be affected.  This may be 
significant in that economic interests are generally less well protected by tort law than 
interests in personal integrity.  It cannot be said, however, that the hospital relationship is the 
only professional relationship that might have a potential impact on a client’s physical 
integrity.  A building that falls down due to the negligence of an architect whilst a client is in 
the building may present similar risks.70  There also does not seem to have been any 
suggestion by judges who favour describing the duty of care owed by a hospital to a patient 
as ‘non-delegable’ that the relationship between a hospital and patient differs where the 
services being provided by the hospital relate solely to a patient’s mental health, despite 
mental health being another interest that attracts considerably less favourable protection by 
tort law than physical integrity.  Furthermore, there are numerous other health professionals 
who commonly conduct their profession outside of a hospital, such as dentists, pharmacists 
and physiotherapists.  Where these services are provided through an organisation, there has 
again been no suggestion that the duty of care owed by those organisation is ‘non-delegable’.   
Justifying the imposition of strict liability on a hospital for the wrongdoing of a third party 
outside circumstances in which vicarious liability might arise on the basis of the information 
deficit inherent in the hospital relationship alone is evidently quite difficult.  The fact that the 
relationship exists prior to wrongdoing appears relevant to the imposition of extended 
liability in negligence but cannot, on its own, justify strict liability for the wrongdoing of a third 
party given the multitude of other professional relationships which also exist prior to 
wrongdoing that do not attract a ‘non-delegable duty of care’.   
                                                          
67 For example, the failure of a solicitor to conduct reasonable due diligence when conducting a conveyance; 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223 (CA). 
68 See generally Leslie Bender, ‘A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort’ (1988) 38 Journal of Legal 
Education 3. 
69 Cane above (n 2). 
70 There is a potential problem of floodgates in this scenario due to the fact that the client may not be the only 
person in the building, but it is not impossible to consider similar issues arising in the medical context, for 
example, the release of a highly contagious patient. 
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B. Trust 
It is of course possible that focusing on the information deficit borne by a patient relative to 
a hospital does not quite capture what it is about the hospital relationship that attracts judges 
to describing the duty of care owed by a hospital to a patient as ‘non-delegable’.  It might be 
that there is something more in the judicial use of terms such as ‘vulnerability’ and 
‘dependence’ than simply identifying the source of that ‘vulnerability’ and ‘dependence’; the 
information deficit.  If there is ‘something more’, a clue might be obtained by looking beyond 
tort law to other areas of private law that regulate professional relationships, specifically 
equity.  In some professional relationships, notably the relationship between solicitor and 
client (but also in other professional relationships on a more ad hoc basis71), equity recognises 
a fiduciary duty.  The fiduciary duty bears some similarities to the ‘non-delegable duty of care’ 
in that fiduciaries are generally required to exercise any discretion vested in them by virtue 
of their position as a fiduciary personally and can be held strictly liable for the wrongdoing of 
a third party to whom the fiduciary has delegated the exercise of that discretion to.72   
In Canada, the relationship between a doctor and patient is recognised as giving rise to a 
fiduciary duty.  As McLachlin J explained in Norberg v Wynrib:73 
I think it is readily apparent that the doctor-patient relationship shares the peculiar hallmark of the 
fiduciary relationship – trust, the trust of a person with inferior power that another person who has 
assumed superior power and responsibility will exercise that power for his or her good and only for his 
or her best interests. 
The information deficit borne by a patient relative to a doctor is undoubtedly one of the 
reasons a patient has to trust a doctor.  Is ‘trust’74 a feature of a hospital relationship that 
might justify the imposition of strict liability on a hospital for the wrongdoing of a third party 
beyond the circumstances in which vicarious liability might arise? 
As with ‘vulnerability’ and ‘dependence’, the term ‘trust’ defies easy definition.  The task 
becomes even more difficult when it is necessary for such a definition to distinguish the ‘trust’ 
a patient places in a hospital from the ‘trust’ that exists in other professional relationships.   
As with patients, the clients of other professionals ‘trust’ those professionals to perform their 
profession reasonably and in the clients’ best interests.   It is, however, only the hospital 
relationship that has tended to attract use of the label ‘non-delegable duty of care’.   
The expansive nature of the doctrine of fiduciary duties adopted by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in comparison to the doctrine outlined by courts in England and Australia also 
suggests caution.75  In neither England nor Australia have the courts formally recognised the 
                                                          
71 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1988] Ch 1 (CA). 
72 As is the case with trustees; Speight v Gaunt (1884) 9 App. Cas. 1 (CA). 
73 [1992] 2 SCR 226, [65] (SCC). 
74 For a discussion of trust in the medical context see:  Onora O’Neill, A Question of Trust (CUP:  Cambridge, 
2002); Su-yin Hor, Natalya Godbold, Aileen Collier and  Rick Iedema, ‘Finding the patient in patient safety 
(2013) 17 Health 567. 
75 Lionel Smith, ‘Fiduciary relationships: ensuring the loyal exercise of judgment on behalf of another’ (2014) 
130 LQR 608. 
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doctor/patient relationship as giving rise to a fiduciary duty.  Although the issue has not arisen 
for formal determination by the Supreme Court in England, it is generally acknowledged76 
that Lord Scarman resolved the issue in Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors when 
he said:77 
Counsel for the appellant referred to Nocton v Lord Ashburton in an attempt to persuade your Lordships 
that the relationship between a doctor and patient is of a fiduciary character entitling a patient to 
equitable relief in the event of a breach of fiduciary duty by a doctor.  The attempt fails:  there is no 
comparison to be made between the relationship of doctor and patient with that of solicitor and client, 
trustee and cestui qui trust or other relationships treated in equity as of a fiduciary character. 
The High Court of Australia was given an indirect opportunity to consider whether the 
doctor/patient relationship gave rise to a fiduciary duty in Breen v Williams.78  The immediate 
issue to be resolved in that case was whether a doctor could be compelled to give a patient 
access to her medical records.  Counsel for the patient had argued that a fiduciary duty owed 
by the doctor to the patient might provide the basis for such access.   A majority79 of the 
judges in the case found that the doctor did not owe the patient a fiduciary duty as, unlike a 
lawyer, a doctor did not act in a ‘representative capacity’.  As Dawson and Toohey JJ 
explained:80 
A doctor is bound to exercise reasonable skill and care in treating and advising a patient, but in doing so 
is acting, not as a representative of the patient, but simply in the exercise of his or her professional 
responsibilities.  No doubt the patient places trust and confidence in the doctor, but it is not because the 
doctor acts on behalf of the patient; it is because the patient is entitled to expect the observance of 
professional standards by the doctor in matters of treatment and advice and is afforded remedies in 
contract and tort if those standards are not observed and the patient suffers damage.   
Justices Dawson and Toohey clearly recognised the ‘trust and confidence’ a patient places in 
a doctor, or indeed a hospital.  In their view, however, such ‘trust and confidence’ was 
insufficient to distinguish the relationship between a doctor and patient from other 
professional relationships.  In contrast, the ‘representative capacity’ in which a lawyer acts on 
behalf of a client was sufficient to distinguish the lawyer/client relationship from other 
professional relationships.  In Dawson and Toohey JJ’s view, it was this feature of the 
lawyer/client relationship that attraced the special protection provided by a fiduciary duty.  
This is not to suggest that the ‘trust and confidence’ placed by a patient in a doctor or hospital 
does not require protection.  Such protection is available through the tort of negligence, 
contract law and possibly, depending on the circumstances, the equitable doctrines of breach 
of confidence and undue influence.81  Importantly, however, such protection extends to 
professional relationships more generally and is not limited to the hospital relationship. 
                                                          
76 Peter Bartlett, ‘Doctors as fiduciaries: Equitable regulation of the doctor-patient relationship’ (1997) 5 
Medical Law Review 193, 193. 
77 [1985] AC 861, 884 (HL). 
78 (1995-1996) 185 CLR 71 (HCA). 
79 Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ (Brennan CJ and Gummow JJ were in the minority). 
80 (1995-1996) 185 CLR 71, 93 (HCA). 
81 ibid 92. 
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C. Control 
It appears therefore that using ‘trust’ as the feature of the hospital relationship that attracts 
use of the label ‘non-delegable duty of care’ does not advance matters much further than 
simply identifying the source of that ‘trust’ (or indeed ‘vulnerability’ or ‘dependence’); the 
information deficit borne by a patient relative to a hospital.  Neither ‘trust’ nor the 
information deficit provides a satisfying justification for imposing strict liability on a hospital 
for the wrongdoing of a third party outside the circumstances in which vicarious liability arises 
as it fails to adequately distinguish the hospital relationship from other professional 
relationships in which such liability is not imposed.  This then only leaves the third feature of 
the hospital relationship that attracts judges to describing the duty of care owed by a hospital 
to a patient as ‘non-delegable’ as a possible justification for imposing strict liability on a 
hospital for the wrongdoing of a third party other than vicarious liability; the capacity of a 
hospital to exercise control over a patient’s use of the hospital premises and, in some 
circumstances, a patient’s body.  The two forms of control need to be examined separately. 
The capacity of a hospital to exercise control over a patient’s use of the hospital premises is 
no different to the capacity of any other occupier to exercise control over the use of their 
premises.  It includes the capacity to set the terms of the patient’s use of the hospital premises 
and, if necessary, to exclude the patient from the hospital premises.  It has never been 
suggested that the duty of care owed by an occupier to an entrant is generally ‘non-
delegable’,82 so that strict liability might be imposed on that occupier to an entrant for the 
wrongdoing of a third party in circumstances beyond that which vicarious liability might arise.  
It follows that if the control a hospital can exercise over a patient is to be used to justify the 
imposition of such strict liability, it will need to be the capacity of a hospital to exercise control 
over a patient’s body, rather than the capacity of a hospital to exercise control over a patient’s 
use of the hospital premises. 
The capacity of a hospital to exercise control over a patient’s body is significant, though 
variable.  The most extreme example is the control that might be exercised by a hospital over 
an unconscious patient on the operating table.83  If a possible justification for the strict liability 
that might be imposed on a hospital under the label ‘non-delegable duty of care’ is to be 
                                                          
82 cf public nuisance cases eg Pickard v Smith which fell into Lord Sumption’s first category of liability 
responding to extra-hazardous circumstances. 
83 Control might also be exercised in a negative sense, in terms of a refusal to treat.  That refusal might be on 
the basis that a hospital lacks appropriate resources (for example, equipment and/or personnel) or on the 
basis that a hospital does not consider the provision of such medical treatment appropriate, as in the recent 
case of Charlie Gard; Gard v United Kingdom 39793/17 (ECHR).  The courts have historically been reluctant to 
use tort law to address such issues.  In the case of public hospitals, courts have long resisted using tort law to 
interfere in public spending decisions (as confirmed most recently in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales 
[2015] AC 1732), preferring instead to use public law mechanisms such as judicial review.  Resource allocation 
decisions by private hospitals are more likely to be subject to actions in contract, either against the hospital 
directly or the relevant insurer.  The action brought in the Gard case was for declaratory relief, the different 
courts resolving the issue on family law and human rights grounds concerning the best interests of the child.  
Given this historical reluctance to use tort law to regulate this negative form of control, it is difficult to now use 
it as a justification for the imposition of strict liability under a ‘non-delegable duty of care’. 
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found in the control a hospital may exercise over a patient’s body in certain circumstances, it 
will be in such an example.  To understand the control a hospital exercises over an 
unconscious patient, however, it is necessary to look beyond the operating table to the 
precipitating circumstances. 
In the ordinary course,84 a patient must first consent to be being put under anaesthetic by a 
hospital.  Importantly, a patient does not have to give their consent if they decide not to go 
ahead with the procedure.  A patient may also withdraw their consent at any time prior to 
the anaesthetic being administered.  If a patient were compelled to undergo medical 
treatment, the position might be very different.  The case of GB v Home Office85 provides such 
an example.  The claimant in that case was held by the government in immigration detention.  
Whilst in immigration detention, she was compelled86 to undertake a course of anti-malarial 
drugs which ‘caused her to suffer a severe psychotic reaction’.87  It was found in that case that 
the government owed the claimant a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ by virtue of which the 
government was held strictly liable for the negligence of the independent contractor engaged 
by the government to administer the anti-malarial drugs to the claimant.88 
The nature of the consent given by a patient can be quite extensive, and typically exceeds 
what can be given in non-medical contexts.  For example, although a patient may consent to 
being reduced to an unconscious state for medical purposes, it is generally not possible to 
consent to being reduced to an unconscious state for other purposes, such as sexual 
gratification.89  Despite this, the granting of consent by a patient does not mean that a hospital 
(or the medical practitioners engaged by the hospital) can exercise unlimited control over a 
patient’s body.  The consent given by a patient will generally stipulate the nature of the 
medical treatment to be performed and, in certain circumstances, the process by which that 
medical treatment will be performed.  The control a hospital can exercise over a patient’s 
body is therefore limited by the terms of the consent given by the patient to the hospital.  
The extent to which a patient is adequately protected by the terms of the consent granted to 
the hospital whilst under anaesthetic will depend on the circumstances surrounding the 
granting of that consent.  This once again brings the information deficit borne by a patient 
relative to a hospital to the fore.  A patient can only effectively exercise their consent in a way 
that protects the patient’s physical integrity when unconscious if the information deficit is 
addressed.  As previously noted, tort law generally responds to the risks presented by the 
information deficit found in professional relationships by extending liability in negligence to 
cover omissions, as well as acts, so that, in certain circumstances, a professional may be held 
liable for failing to take reasonable, positive steps to prevent foreseeable harm to a client as 
                                                          
84 Emergency situations are discussed below. 
85 [2015] EWHC 819. 
86 ibid [31]. 
87 ibid [1]. 
88 ibid [42]. 
89 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 (HL). 
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well as for any foreseeable harm caused by the professional’s own unreasonable conduct.  
Consistent with this approach, tort law’s response to the risks presented by the information 
deficit for a patient when giving consent to medical treatment is to impose a positive duty on 
a hospital to take reasonable care to advise the patient of all material risks associated with 
that medical treatment.  In Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board,90 the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom held that a hospital, or more specifically the doctor engaged by the 
hospital, had a positive duty to:91 
…take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in any 
recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments.  The test of 
materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s 
position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware 
that the particular patient would be likely attach significance to it. 
Montgomery is a significant decision, heralding a marked departure from the more 
‘paternalistic’ approach the English courts had previously taken to a patient’s welfare.  Under 
that approach, whether information was provided to a patient was determined by reference 
to a ‘responsible body of medical opinion’92 rather than a patient’s needs.  In Montgomery, 
the focus shifted from the medical professionals to the patient, with patients being treated:93 
…so far as possible as adults who are capable of understanding that medical treatment is uncertain of 
success and may involve risks, accepting responsibility for the taking of risks affecting their own lives and 
living with the consequences of their choices. 
This focus on a patient’s autonomy, rather than their alleged ‘vulnerability’ or ‘dependence’, 
puts a patient once again in a similar position to any other client dealing with a professional.  
The information deficit borne by the patient relative to a hospital presents certain risks but, 
as with other professional relationships, tort law addresses those risks by placing certain 
positive duties on hospitals.  In light of this, it is once again difficult to see the control that 
might be exercised by a hospital, in certain circumstances, over a patient’s body as providing 
a satisfying justification for holding the hospital strictly liable for the wrongdoing of a third 
party in circumstances beyond those in which vicarious liability arises when such liability is 
not imposed in other professional relationships.  The control exercised by a hospital over a 
patient’s body is restricted by the terms upon which a patient consents to medical treatment, 
and the risks faced by a patient in giving that consent are mitigated by a positive duty on a 
hospital to inform the patient of all material risks associated with the medical treatment. 
There are exceptions to a hospital’s positive duty to disclose material risks associated with 
medical treatment to a patient.  A hospital may not be able to obtain appropriate consent in 
an emergency situation, for example where the patient is already unconscious.94  A hospital 
may also withhold information where disclosure ‘would be seriously detrimental to the 
                                                          
90 [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] AC 1430 (‘Montgomery’). 
91 ibid [87]. 
92 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871 (HL). 
93 [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] AC 1430 [81]. 
94 ibid [88]. 
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patient’s health’.95  These situations are less common.  Consequently, even if it were possibly 
to justify the imposition of strict liability on a hospital for the wrongdoing of a third party in 
circumstances beyond those in which vicarious liability arises on the basis of the control a 
hospital exercises over the body of a patient in such circumstances, the justification would 
not extend to the imposition of such liability in the hospital relationship more generally. 
V. COMPARING THE FEATURES OF THE HOSPITAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
EMPLOYMENT AND SCHOOL RELATIONSHIPS 
This article has examined three features of the hospital relationship (the information deficit 
borne by a patient relative to a hospital, the fact that a hospital and patient are not strangers 
prior to any wrongdoing and the capacity of a hospital to exercise control over a patient’s use 
of the hospital premises and, in some circumstances, a patient’s body) and argued that none 
of those features, either alone or in combination, provide a satisfying justification for the 
imposition of strict liability on a hospital for the wrongdoing of a third party in circumstances 
beyond those in which vicarious liability might be imposed.  It may, of course, be possible to 
identify yet further features of the hospital relationship which might also have justificatory 
potential, for example, the limited control a patient has in determining who provides medical 
treatment at a hospital (as suggested in stage three of Lord Sumption’s test in Woodland96).97  
To succeed, any such features would need to be able to distinguish the hospital relationship 
from other professional relationships in which such liability is not imposed.  A client of a law 
firm, for instance, may similarly have limited control over which lawyer at the law firm will 
provide the necessary legal advice.98  It is submitted that the principal features of a hospital 
relationship, or at least those generally recognised by judges as possibly attracting use of the 
label ‘non-delegable’, have been examined. 
So far, there has been very little evidence to support Lord Sumption’s conclusion in Woodland 
that the hospital relationship gives rise to a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ such that strict 
liability might be imposed on a hospital for the wrongdoing of a third party beyond the 
circumstances in which vicarious liability might arise.  An analysis of the cases did not 
demonstrate any increased willingness by the courts to impose this extraordinary form of 
strict liability.  Similarly, none of the features of the hospital relationship that have attracted 
judges to using the label ‘non-delegable’ to describe the duty of care owed by a hospital to a 
patient seem capable of eliciting a justification which would not also apply to other 
professional relationships in which such strict liability is not imposed.   Any last refuge for Lord 
Sumption seems only to be found in a comparison of the features of the hospital relationship 
with the features of the other relationship which are recognised as giving rise to a ‘non-
delegable duty of care’ (that is, the employment and school relationships).  If there is no real 
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96 [2014] AC 537, 583 (UKSC). 
97 See, for example, Jaman Estate v Hussain [2002] 11 WWR 241 (Man. Court of QB). 
98 Although control can increase with the status of the client, particularly where the client is a high consumer 
of legal services. 
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distinction between the features of the three relationships, it may still be possible to include 
the hospital relationship in the family of relationships that gives rise to a ‘non-delegable duty 
of care’. 
Unfortunately for Lord Sumption, close examination of all three relationships reveals that 
there is a significant difference between the features of the hospital relationship and the 
features of the employment and school relationships.  In the employment and school 
relationships, an employer and school is vested with general authority to direct the conduct 
of employees and students respectively.   
Under the contract of employment, an employee voluntarily submits to the authority of the 
employer by agreeing to do what is asked by the employer in return for a regular wage.99  Any 
failure on behalf of an employee to comply with the directions of their employer is capable 
of being addressed by the employer as a breach of contract or through some other form of 
disciplinary action.  Such authority is broad in scope.  Under a typical employment contract, 
an employer is given authority by the employee to direct all of the employee’s conduct in the 
course of employment for the purposes of the employer’s business.100  This authority will 
continue until the employment relationship is brought to an end by one of the parties.  Also 
significant is the fact that the terms of the authority vested in an employer are put in place at 
the beginning of the employment relationship and need not101 be reviewed for the duration 
of the employment relationship.  This can be contrasted with any of the other types of 
contracts that might be entered into by an employer in order to secure the use of human 
resources.  For example, an employer may engage a person to do a particular thing, such as 
write a report or build a structure.  These types of contracts have increased with the need of 
employers for flexibility in managing their human resources.  Under such contracts, although 
some type of authority may be given by the person to the employer, it will necessarily be 
limited by reference to the task and its duration and the need to enter a new contract if those 
parameters are exceeded. 
Authority is similarly a feature of the school relationship.  In order to educate students, 
schools are vested with authority to direct the activities and conduct of their students.  Such 
                                                          
99 See generally Christine Beuermann ‘Tort law in the employment relationship: A response to the potential 
abuse of an employer’s authority’, (2014) Torts Law Journal 169. 
100 Such authority might, however, be limited by the particular role the employee was appointed to perform 
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authority is not derived from parents,102  but from legislation.103   This legislation first gives 
schools the authority to require students to attend school.  Once a student has been enrolled 
at a school, the school must monitor attendance104 and mechanisms are put in place to 
respond to instances of truancy.  Secondly, the legislation gives schools the express authority 
to maintain discipline within the school.105  This means that schools are not only authorised 
to direct the conduct of students but to discipline individual students for failing to comply 
with those directions. 
Significantly, authority is not a feature of the hospital relationship.  A hospital is not vested 
with any general authority to direct the conduct of a patient.  A patient may consent to 
medical treatment, but the purpose of this consent is to legally excuse the hospital from 
committing a battery in clearly articulated circumstances.  It does not vest a hospital with the 
general authority to direct the conduct of a patient at the hospital’s discretion.  Although 
tempting to draw similarities between the consent granted by a patient in a hospital and the 
authority vested in an employer or school over an employee or student, there are a number 
of key differences.   First, any control a hospital might exercise over a patient who has 
consented to medical treatment is for a single purpose and must be exercised for the patient’s 
benefit.  In contrast, the authority vested in an employer to direct the conduct of an employee 
is a general authority that is exercised for the employer’s benefit.  Similarly, the authority 
vested in a school to direct the conduct of a student is exercised for the benefit of all students 
and society more generally.106  Secondly, any control a hospital might exercise over a patient 
who has consented to medical treatment is limited by the terms of the consent which are 
prescribed by the patient.  In the employment relationship, the duration of the period of 
employment, and imbalances in bargaining power, make it very difficult for an employee to 
protect themselves against the exercise of the authority vested in an employer when 
negotiating their employment contract.  In the school relationship, any protection available 
to a student in respect of the exercise of authority by a school is generally prescribed in 
legislation or general law, given that there is no contract governing the education of a sizeable 
proportion of school children.  Thirdly, a patient can withdraw their consent to medical 
treatment at any time.  In contrast, students are compelled to attend school and employees 
must serve out notice periods before leaving their employment.   Finally, both employees and 
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104 See Education Act 1996 (UK), s 444. 
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students face potential disciplinary action if they do not comply with a direction issued by an 
employer or school respectively.  A patient faces no such disciplinary action in respect of the 
consent granted to a hospital to conduct medical treatment.  As the purpose of such consent 
is to relieve a hospital from legal liability, the notion of disciplining a patient is nonsensical.  
At best, a hospital has the right to direct a patient off hospital premises, but this is no more 
than the capacity of any occupier to exclude an individual from their premises.   
The feature of authority is therefore common to only the employment and school 
relationships; no such authority is present in the hospital relationship.  The presence of 
authority is also central to the functioning of those relationship.  In the employment 
relationship, such authority enables an employer to achieve the commercial objectives which 
led to the employment relationship being established.  In the school relationship, such 
authority enables education to occur by ensuring that students both attend and have a 
suitable environment for learning.   
VI. CONFERRED AUTHORITY STRICT LIABILITY 
I have argued elsewhere that it is the authority vested in an employer and school to direct the 
conduct of an employee and student respectively that attracts the extraordinary form of strict 
liability for the wrongdoing of a third party imposed for breach of a so-called ‘non-delegable 
duty of care’. 107  
Both employers and schools have the capacity to confer authority to direct the conduct of 
employees and students upon another person.  This capacity exists because the possibility of 
meeting the objectives for which the authority was created would be unduly limited if such 
authority could be exercised by an employer or school alone.  The capacity of an employer or 
school to confer authority to direct the conduct of an employee or student upon another 
person, however, is not without its problems.  When an employer or school confers its 
authority to direct the conduct of an employee or student upon another person, it creates a 
power relationship which did not previously exist.  This power relationship enables the person 
upon whom authority has been conferred to direct the conduct of an employee or student 
and creates an expectation that the employee or student will obey.  As the person upon whom 
authority has been conferred is not necessarily subject to the same restraints in the exercise 
of that authority as the employer or school, there is significant potential for this power 
relationship to be abused.  A teacher, for instance, may direct a student to perform a scientific 
experiment, but fail to provide that student with appropriate safety equipment.108  Employees 
and students are consequently put at risk of physical harm whenever their employer or school 
confers upon another person authority to direct the conduct of the employee or student. 
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It is arguably this potential for a person upon whom authority has been conferred by an 
employer or school to abuse the power relationship created by the employer or school’s 
conferral of authority which attracts the concern and the intervention of the law.  Strict 
liability for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’, or what can be more accurately described 
as ‘conferred authority strict liability’, responds to the potential for abuse of the power 
relationship created by the employer or school’s conferral of authority by holding the 
employer or school liable regardless of personal fault for any harm wrongfully caused to an 
employee or student by the person upon whom authority has been conferred.  The liability 
effectively holds an employer or school to account for damage wrongfully caused to an 
employee or student by a person upon whom the employer or school has conferred its 
authority to direct the conduct of the employee or student.  In so doing, the liability provides 
employees and students with a degree of protection from an abuse of the authority conferred 
by their employer or school upon another person.   
It is relatively unusual in tort law for one person to be held strictly liable for the wrongdoing 
of another.  As the defendant did not personally engage in wrongdoing, some other 
connection between the defendant and the wrongdoing needs to be drawn.  It has never been 
sufficient for such purposes that a defendant merely provided an opportunity for wrongdoing 
to occur.109  When an employer or school confers authority on another person to direct the 
conduct of an employee or student, however, it does more than provide a mere opportunity 
for wrongdoing to occur.110  The power relationship created by the conferral of authority can 
provide the means by which wrongdoing might occur.  A teacher, for instance, can use the 
authority conferred upon them by a school to direct a student into a private room in order to 
perpetrate a sexual assault.  It is not that an abuse of authority will necessarily occur, but 
there is always an inherent risk that the authority conferred by the employer or school upon 
another person to direct the conduct of an employee or student will be abused.  It appears 
from the cases that this risk is sufficient for strict liability to be imposed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This object of this article was to examine whether the relationships identified by 
Lord Sumption as giving rise to a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ formed an appropriate basis for 
the development of his five stage test.  Specifically, it sought to identify whether the duty of 
care owed by a hospital to a patient was indeed ‘non-delegable’, such that a hospital may, in 
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certain circumstances, be held strictly liable to a patient for the wrongdoing of a third party.  
The article has shown that: 
(a) the label ‘non-delegable’ was first used to describe the duty of care owed by a hospital 
to a patient to overcome difficulties in holding a hospital vicariously liable for the 
negligence of highly skilled medical practitioners; 
(b) although use of the label persisted once those difficulties were removed, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the label’s use has correspondingly led to an increased 
willingness by the courts to impose strict liability on a hospital to a patient for the 
wrongdoing of a third party beyond the circumstances in which vicarious liability might 
be imposed; 
(c) none of the three principal features of the hospital relationship which have generally 
attracted judges to using the label ‘non-delegable’ to describe the duty of care owed 
by a hospital to a patient (namely the information deficit borne by a patient relative 
to a hospital, the fact that a hospital and patient are not strangers prior to any 
wrongdoing and the capacity of a hospital to exercise control over a patient’s use of 
the hospital premises and, in some circumstances, a patient’s body) provide a 
satisfactory justification for the imposition of such an extraordinary form of strict 
liability which would not also apply in other professional relationships in which such 
liability is not imposed; 
(d) the feature of authority provides a significant difference between the hospital 
relationship and the employment and school relationships which are recognised as 
giving rise to a ‘non-delegable duty of care’; 
(e) it is arguably the potential for the authority vested in an employer or school to direct 
the conduct of an employee or student to be abused when conferred on a third party 
that attracts the imposition of strict liability for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty of 
care’, or what can be more accurately described as conferred authority strict liability. 
It follows that Lord Sumption erred when he included the hospital relationship in the category 
of relationships which gave rise to a ‘non-delegable duty of care’.  The veracity of Lord 
Sumption’s test for determining the existence of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ must now be 
brought into question.   At best, the hospital relationship, along with other professional 
relationships, provides an opportunity for wrongdoing to occur.  Given the extraordinary 
nature of the liability, this has never been sufficient for strict liability for the wrongdoing of a 
third party to be imposed. 
 
